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ABSTRACT
This work investigates the vulnerability of Gaussian Mix-
ture Model (GMM) i-vector based speaker verification (SV)
systems to adversarial attacks, and the transferability of ad-
versarial samples crafted from GMM i-vector based systems
to x-vector based systems. In detail, we formulate the GMM
i-vector based system as a scoring function, and leverage the
fast gradient sign method (FGSM) to generate adversarial
samples through this function. These adversarial samples
are used to attack both GMM i-vector and x-vector based
systems. We measure the vulnerability of the systems by the
degradation of equal error rate and false acceptance rate. Ex-
perimental results show that GMM i-vector based systems are
seriously vulnerable to adversarial attacks, and the generated
adversarial samples are proved to be transferable and pose
threats to neural network speaker embedding based systems
(e.g. x-vector systems).
Index Terms— Adversarial attack, speaker verification,
GMM i-vector, x-vector
1. INTRODUCTION
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems aim at con-
firming a spoken utterance against a speaker identity claim.
Through decades of years’ development, speaker verification
community has made great progress and applied this tech-
nology in many biometric authentication cases, such as voice
activation in phones, bank authentication online, etc.
However, past research has shown that ASV systems are
vulnerable to malicious attacks via spoofing and fake speech,
such as imitated [1, 2], replayed [2, 3], synthetic [4, 5] and
converted [6] speech. These spoofing and fake speech are
created to sound like the voice of the target person as much as
possible. Moreover, ASV systems can also be spoofed even
though the spoofing speech sounds like the voice of the non-
target person from human perception. It will expose the sys-
tems to some other dangerous situations, such as controlling
one’s voice-operated devices in place of the real owner un-
beknownst to him/her. These situations can be achieved by
adversarial attacks.
According to [7–9], deep neural networks (DNNs) with
impressive performance can be vulnerable to simple adversar-
ial attacks in many tasks, such as face recognition [10,11], im-
age classification [12,13], and speech recognition [14]. How-
ever, to the best of our knowledge, the only work that applied
adversarial attack into ASV systems is [15] where they ver-
ified the vulnerability of an end-to-end ASV system to ad-
versarial attacks. Briefly, there are three representative ASV
frameworks: i-vector speaker embedding based systems [16–
19], neural network (NN) speaker embedding based systems
[20, 21] and end-to-end approaches [22–24]. While end-to-
end based systems have proved to be vulnerable to adversarial
attacks, the robustness of other approaches, including GMM
i-vector based systems and NN speaker embedding based sys-
tems (e.g. x-vector systems we implement), still remains to
be explored. Importantly, GMM i-vector based systems are
widely applied to biometric authentication, and it is impera-
tive to investigate their robustness to such adversarial attacks.
Adversarial attacks have two main scenarios: white box
attack and black box attack. White box attack allows the at-
tacker to access the complete parameters of the system, and
adversarial samples can be constructed by an optimization on
the input while fixing the system parameters. Black box at-
tacker only has the access to the system’s input and output,
and adversarial samples are crafted by other substitute sys-
tems. To generate an adversarial sample, a designed subtle
perturbation is added to the input so that the system outputs
a wrong prediction while there is nearly no difference from
human perception between spoofing and original input.
This work focuses on the robustness of GMM i-vector
systems under adversarial attacks, and the adversarial sam-
ples’ transferability to x-vector systems. One of the simplest
attack methods, i.e. fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [9], is
adopted to generate adversarial samples from GMM i-vector
systems. These samples are used to perform white and black
box attacks on GMM i-vector systems, and black box attack
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on x-vector systems. Our codes will be made open-source1.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 in-
troduce the ASV systems and FGSM adopted in our exper-
iments, respectively. Experiment setup and results are illus-
trated in Section 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes this work.
2. AUTOMATIC SPEAKER VERIFICATION
SYSTEMS
In this work, GMM i-vector and x-vector systems are involved
in our experiments. Both GMM i-vector and x-vector systems
have two parts: a front-end for utterance-level speaker embed-
ding extraction and a back-end for speaker similarity scoring.
In our experiments, we adopt the probabilistic linear discrim-
inant analysis (PLDA) back-end for both kinds of systems.
2.1. Gaussian Mixture Model i-vector extraction
The illustration of GMM i-vector extractor [16] is shown in
Fig. 1. It consists of a Gaussian Mixture Model-universal
background model (GMM-UBM) and a total variability ma-
trix (T matrix). Given the acoustic features of utterance i,
GMM-UBM is used to extract zero (Ni) and first (f˜i) order
statistics by Baum-Welch statistics computation. The statis-
tics information is incorporated with T matrix to extract i-
vector ωi as Eq. 1,
ωi = Li
−1T>(Σ(b))−1f˜i (1)
where Li = I + T>(Σ(b))−1NiT , I is the identity matrix
and Σ(b) is the covariance matrix of GMM-UBM.
2.2. x-vector extraction
The x-vector extractor [21] leverages DNNs to produce
speaker-discriminative embeddings. It consists of frame-
and utterance-level extractors. At the frame level, acous-
tic features are fed forward by several layers of time delay
neural network (TDNN). At the utterance level, statistics
pooling layer aggregates all the frame-level outputs from the
last frame-level layer and computes their mean and standard
deviation. The mean and standard deviation are concatenated
together and propagated through utterance-level layers and
finally softmax output layer. In the testing stage, given acous-
tic features of an utterance, the embedding layer output is
extracted as the x-vector.
2.3. Probabilistic linear discriminant analysis back-end
PLDA is a supervised version of factor analysis [25]. It mod-
els i-vectors/x-vectors (ω) by Eq. 2,
ω =m+ Φβ + r (2)
1https://github.com/lixucuhk/adversarial-attack-on-GMM-i-vector-
based-speaker-verification-systems
Fig. 1. The illustration of GMM i-vector extractor
where m is a global bias term, the columns of Φ provides a
basis of speaker-specific subspace, and β ∈ N(0, I) is a la-
tent speaker-identity vector. The residual term r ∈ N(0,Σ)
has a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and a full cor-
variance matrix Σ. The model parameters {m, Φ, Σ} are
estimated with expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm on
the training set.
In the testing stage, score S is estimated as a log likeli-
hood ratio of two conditional probabilities (Eq. 3). ω1 and
ω2 are i-vectors/x-vectors extracted from enrollment and test
utterances, respectively. Hs is the hypothesis that two utter-
ances belong to the same identity, whereasHd is the opposite.
S = log
P (ω1,ω2|Hs)
P (ω1,ω2|Hd)
= log
P (ω1,ω2|Hs)
P (ω1|Hd)P (ω2|Hd) (3)
3. ADVERSARIAL SAMPLES GENERATION
In a general case, we denote a system function as f with pa-
rameters θ. Given the input x, we search for an adversar-
ial perturbation δx to be added to x for maximizing the loss
function L between the system’s prediction and ground truth
y, as shown in Eq. 4,
δx = arg max‖δx‖p≤
L(fθ(x+ δx), y) (4)
Note that the system parameters θ are fixed and we revise the
inputx to maximize the the deviation between the system pre-
diction and the ground truth, to make the system give a wrong
prediction. The constraint that the p-norm of δx is within a
perturbation degree  guarantees human can not distinguish
the adversarial sample x? = x+ δx from original x.
3.1. Fast gradient sign method
In this work, fast gradient sign method (FGSM) is adopted to
solve Eq. 5, in which the norm p is specialized as ∞. The
solution is given in Eq. 5,
δx = × sign(∇xL(fθ(x), y)) (5)
where function sign(·) takes the sign of the gradient. FGSM
perturbs x with a small perturbation  multiplied by the sign
of the gradient to generate adversarial samples (x?).
3.2. Problem formulation & evaluation matrics
In this work, we generate adversarial samples from GMM i-
vector systems. We denote the whole system by two parts:
i-vector extraction function f with parameter θ1 and PLDA
scoring function S with parameter θ2. The acoustic feature
sequence of each utterance is denoted by X . Normalization
steps, such as i-vector normalization, are implicitly included
within the functions.
In the testing stage, each trial consists of one enrollment
utteranceX(e) and one test utteranceX . To mimic a realistic
model attack, we fix X(e) and system parameters {θ1, θ2},
and revise X of all trials to perform adversarial attacks. For
GMM i-vector framework, there is no explicit ground truth
y and loss function L for each output score. We optimize
the output score S according to target/non-target trials. For
target trials, i.e. the enrollment and test utterances belong to
one person, we minimize the similarity score. While for non-
target trials, we maximize the score. The problem formulation
and its solution are shown in Eq. 6, 7 and 8.
δX = arg max‖δX‖p≤
k × Sθ2(fθ1(X), fθ1(X(e))) (6)
δX = × k × sign(∇XSθ2(fθ1(X), fθ1(X(e)))) (7)
k = { −1, target trial
1, non-target trial (8)
In this work, we measure the vulnerability of the systems
to adversarial attacks by the degradation of the systems’ equal
error rate (EER) and false acceptance rate (FAR). EER is the
rate where acceptance and rejection errors are equal. It re-
flects the balanced system error rate in terms of acceptance
and rejection. The FAR threshold is fixed as the EER thresh-
old in the system without attack. FAR reflects the prediction
error rate over non-target trials.
4. EXPERIMENT SETUP
The dataset used in this experiment is Voxceleb1 [26], which
consists of short clips of human speech. There are totally
148,642 utterances for 1251 speakers. Consistent with [26],
4874 utterances for 40 speakers are reserved for testing, to
generate trials and perform adversarial attacks. The remain-
ing utterances are used for training our SV models. In addi-
tion, we apply data augmentation [21] when training x-vector
embedding networks.
Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) and log
power magnitude spectrums (LPMSs) are adopted as acous-
tic features in this experiment. To extract MFCCs, a pre-
emphasis with coefficient of 0.97 is adopted. “Hamming”
window having size of 25ms and step-size of 10ms is applied
to extract a frame, and finally 24 cepstral coefficients are
kept. For LPMSs, “blackman” window having size of 8ms
and step-size of 4ms is adopted. No pre-emphasis is applied.
4.1. ASV model configuration
In the GMM i-vector system setup, only voice activity de-
tection (VAD) is applied for preprocessing acoustic features.
2048-mixture UBM with full covariance matrix cooperates T
matirx with a 400-dimension i-vector space. The i-vectors are
centered and length-normalized before PLDA modeling.
In the x-vector system, cepstral mean and variance nor-
malization (CMVN) and VAD are adopted to preprocess the
acoustic features. The setup of x-vector embedding net-
work is commonly consistent with [21]. And the extracted
x-vectors are centered and projected using a 200-dimension
LDA, and then length-normalized before PLDA modeling.
4.2. Adversarial attack configuration
In this work, we train three ASV models: MFCC based
GMM i-vector system (MFCC-ivec), LPMS based GMM i-
vector system (LPMS-ivec) and MFCC based x-vector system
(MFCC-xvec), and perform white and black box attacks. Two
white box attacks are performed on MFCC-ivec and LPMS-
ivec systems respectively, and three black box attacks in the
mutual attack settings: LPMS-ivec attacks MFCC-ivec (cross
feature), MFCC-ivec attacks MFCC-xvec (cross model ar-
chitecture) and LPMS-ivec attacks MFCC-xvec (cross both).
The last two settings is to investigate the adversarial samples’
transferability to x-vector systems.
4.3. ABX test
To evaluate the auditory indistinguishability of adversarial au-
dios compared with the original audios, we perform the ABX
test [27], which is a forced choice test to identify detectable
differences between two choices of sensory stimuli. The ad-
versarial samples are generated from the LPMS-ivec by using
FGSM with  equal to 1. Each adversarial audio is recon-
structed from the perturbed LPMSs and the phase of its cor-
responding original audio. In this work, 50 randomly selected
original-adversarial audio (A and B) pairs are presented to lis-
teners, and from each pair one audio is chosen as the audio X.
Eight listeners join this test, and they are asked to choose one
audio from A and B, which is the audio X.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
5.1. ABX test results
Experimental results show that the average accuracy of ABX
test is 51.5%, which verifies that human cannot distinguish
between the adversarial and corresponding original audios.
5.2. White box attack
We perform white box attack on two GMM i-vector systems,
i.e. MFCCs and LPMSs based systems. The EERs of the
Table 1. EER (%) of the target systems under attack with different perturbation degrees ().
 = 0  = 0.3  = 1  = 5  = 10  = 20  = 30  = 50
LPMS-ivec attacks MFCC-ivec 7.20 8.83 13.82 50.02 69.04 74.62 74.59 63.24
MFCC-ivec attacks MFCC-xvec 6.62 8.52 14.06 57.43 74.32 60.85 54.07 51.34
LPMS-ivec attacks MFCC-xvec 6.62 7.42 9.49 25.47 37.51 43.89 48.48 48.39
Table 2. EER (%) of the GMM i-vector systems under attack
with different perturbation degrees ().
 = 0  = 0.3  = 1  = 5  = 10
MFCC-ivec 7.20 81.78 97.64 50.25 50.72
LPMS-ivec 10.24 94.04 99.95 99.77 88.6
Table 3. FAR (%) of the GMM i-vector systems under attack
with different perturbation degrees ().
 = 0  = 0.3  = 1  = 5  = 10
MFCC-ivec 7.20 82.91 96.87 18.14 16.65
LPMS-ivec 10.24 96.78 99.99 99.64 69.95
systems under different perturbation degree  are shown in
Table 2. Especially, the columns where  equals 0 exhibit
the performance of the systems without attack. We observe
that both systems are most vulnerable when  equals 1, where
the EERs are both increased by around 90%. Meanwhile, the
FARs of the systems are also shown in Table 3. The FARs of
both systems are increased by around 90% when  equals 1.
These two observations confirm that GMM i-vector systems
are vulnerable to white box attack. Another observation is
that the attack success rate increases first and then decreases
as  increases, rather than keeps increasing with . The in-
crease at first (small perturbation) is due to the adversarial
perturbation effort, but a large perturbation will bring much
difference and mitigate this effort to make the attack success
rate down. Technically speaking, the function S (in Eq. 6)
w.r.t. the input X is actually non-convex, and a large pertur-
bation breaks the linear approximation of S at point X as-
sumed by FGSM. This will decrease the attack effectiveness.
5.3. Black box attack
As configured in Section 4.2, three black box attack set-
tings are involved, i.e. LPMS-ivec attacks MFCC-ivec (cross
feature), MFCC-ivec attacks MFCC-xvec (cross model ar-
chitecture) and LPMS-ivec attacks MFCC-xvec (cross both).
EERs and FARs are shown in Table 1 and Fig. 2 respectively.
We observe that EER is increased by 67.42%, 67.70% and
41.86% in the settings of cross feature, cross model architec-
ture and cross both, respectively. Also, FAR is increased by
around 60%, 50% and 30% in cross feature, model architec-
ture and both respectively. These observations confirm that
both GMM i-vector and x-vector systems are vulnerable to
Fig. 2. FAR (%) of the target systems under attack with dif-
ferent perturbation degrees ().
black box attack. And the systems are most fragile to cross-
feature attack, while relatively more robust to cross-both
attack. We also observe that the  where the target system
is most vulnerable is different due to different source-target
attack settings. In some cases,  increases to a large value to
make the most serious attack, e.g. 20 in the cross-feature set-
ting. In this case, the spoofing audio has a noise that human
can easily perceive, but human can still confirm the spoofing
and original one belong to the same person. Here2 are some
adversarial samples and the corresponding system responses.
Since x-vector systems prove to be vulnerable to black box
attack, it suggests that these systems are also vulnerable to a
more aggressive attack, i.e. white box attack.
6. CONCLUSION
In this work, we investigate the vulnerability of GMM i-
vector systems to adversarial attacks and the adversarial
transferability to x-vector systems. Experimental results show
that GMM i-vector systems are vulnerable to both white and
black box attacks. The generated adversarial samples are also
proved to be transferable to NN speaker embedding based
systems, e.g. x-vector systems. Further work will focus on
protecting SV systems against such adversarial attacks.
2https://lixucuhk.github.io/adversarial-samples-attacking-ASV-systems
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